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THE LANGUAGE OF CLASS IN CHINA
LIN CHUN
The post-Mao regime’s mantra of Jiegui (‘getting on the global track’), or willing participation in the latest round of capitalist globalization, 
has redirected China’s development path. The country has now become the 
world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, largest trade-dependent 
exporter, largest energy consumer and largest producer of carbon emissions, 
mostly at the low end of the global productive chain. As its economy – 
including its finance and other strategic sectors – becomes ever more open, 
a deeply problematic national growth pattern based on officially endorsed 
‘cheap labour’ becomes entrenched in the international division of labour, 
vastly favouring global capital. This pattern also entails a reshaped social 
structure and reshaped relations of production, above all a renewed validation 
of the exploitative and repressive power of capital – private and bureaucratic, 
domestic and transnational – over labour. Fuelling the enormous market 
expansion of a late capitalism hungry for space, China is also now one of 
the most environmentally polluted and socially unequal nations on earth. In 
other words, over half a century after the 1949 revolution, China is again 
being radically transformed, this time from a variant of state socialism to a 
variant of state capitalism. The country’s double path dependency – on the 
one hand, from pre-reform Chinese socialism, and on the other, from its 
newly endorsed globalization – distorts or limits its transition to capitalism, 
a transition project that is no longer tentative or politically hidden. Yet 
this project still cannot be openly embraced in official statements due to 
the enshrined commitment of the People’s Republic to socialism and the 
enduring attachment of the Chinese people to revolutionary and socialist 
traditions. This peculiar disjunction causes some extraordinary difficulties, 
not just in the articulation of class politics, but also in the way class politics 
operate in practice. 
The weakness, if not the complete absence, of an independent working-
class movement in China cannot be explained by repression alone. Multiple 
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impediments to class consciousness and stronger labour mobilization arise 
from contradictory social changes and their confusing messages. For example, 
a singular Chinese phenomenon is a discrepancy between displacement and 
dispossession, thanks to the fact that the majority of migrant workers from 
the countryside retain their rural land rights. It is true that the younger 
generation is increasingly ‘landless’, in the sense that the initial redistribution 
of land in the early 1980s, organized on the basis of a newly introduced 
‘family responsibility’ system, has not kept up with demographic changes in 
many places. However, insofar as the rural households remain protected by 
certain rights to land, the commodification and proletarianization of labour 
is fundamentally incomplete. In people’s subjective perceptions, when the 
ambiguity involved in a ‘socialist’ state taking a capitalist path is set aside, the 
contrast between visible gains in material prosperity and past scarcity hampers 
even the most ardent critics of the market transition. Such contradictions 
function dialectically to stabilize an otherwise crisis-ridden process, in the 
context of a formerly (and officially still) communist party undergoing a 
profound self-transformation. Meanwhile, unprecedentedly rapid economic 
trends also affect culture and social organization in ways ranging from fervent 
consumerism and the popularity of new communication technologies, to an 
extensive financialization that destabilizes everything from macroeconomic 
policy and institutions to household budgets. As labour processes diversify 
and the young, the better trained, the self-employed and cosmopolitan 
careerists pursue more autonomy in work and life, exploitation and control 
must take fresh forms, and so do class identities and struggle.
The refusal of the language of class, to be discussed below, is a titanic act 
of symbolic violence on the part of the Chinese state, committed as part 
of a political strategy to make way for ‘reform and opening’. The tactic is 
also evident in official phrases such as ‘socialist market economy’, ‘primary 
socialist stage’, or ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ – all of them 
largely devoid of socialist content. By the same token, China’s working men 
and women need an alternative vocabulary as a politico-ideological weapon 
for articulating their situations and demands. At issue is thus not only the 
way the concept of class is diluted or muted in China’s de-revolutionized 
polity; it is also about the way in which the lack of a language of class-
based counter-hegemony helps to explain the lack of counter-hegemonic 
organizational capacity.1 
To say this is not to endorse the views of those who imagine that class 
conflicts can somehow be overcome outside the realm of political economy. 
The damage caused by the kind of identity politics which involves discursive 
political attacks on ‘class essentialism’ are manifest. The alarming retreat from 
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both gender equality and ethnic peace in China, following the imposed 
denial of class, makes this powerfully clear.2 In that light class continues to be 
what the renewal of a multi-dimensioned, universal struggle for liberation 
ultimately depends on. As Marx famously put it, the working class as the 
bearer of human emancipation is a class ‘which has a universal character 
because its sufferings are universal, and which does not claim a particular 
redress because the wrong which is done to it is not a particular wrong but wrong 
in general’.3 Such a class thus cannot transform its own conditions without 
transforming society as a whole. A dialectical rather than a mechanical 
linkage between ‘class’ and its ‘language’, then, has to be constantly made 
in the very practice of expressing, interrogating and acting on class interests.
The purpose of this essay is to outline the making, unmaking and 
remaking of the major classes in China since the communist revolution. The 
communist party and its state and ‘ideological state apparatus’ have played 
a pivotal role in that trajectory, mediated by an institutionalized system of 
language and rhetoric. As official discourse was able to penetrate the infra-
politics of everyday speech, the way power is exercised is traceable in its 
evolving political glossary. In the following sections I aim to clarify the 
class nature of the party’s project in the way it seeks to position China in 
the global context. I will also trace the changes of class structure in China’s 
market reforms; changes that are closely linked to the expanding global 
market and affect not only the relations between capital and labour, but also 
those between the state and labour, and state and capital. My main focus 
is the peasants-turned-workers and their plight, and hence the question of 
the class consciousness of a massively enlarged Chinese working class. The 
realignment of classes, and the corresponding new class lexicon, that will be 
needed for the impending development of a new transformative project to 
recapture state power will be noted for future consideration. 
‘TAKING CLASS STRUGGLE AS THE KEY LINK’: REVOLUTION 
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SOCIALIST TRANSITION
The party saw revolution as necessitated by the basic contradictions that 
had to be overcome: contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese 
nation, and between ‘feudalism’ (referring to landlordism and premodern 
social forms in general) and the popular masses. The revolution was thus 
intrinsically and simultaneously national and social in nature. More creative 
still was its strategy of seizing power by encircling the cities from their rural 
peripheries through a ‘people’s war’. In the Chinese Marxist conception, 
this revolution, led by a communist party, is defined as ‘new democratic’ 
because its maximum programme contained a socialist ambition. It is 
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thus categorically distinguished from the classical bourgeois revolutions 
which, while having a democratic aspect, only paved the way for capitalist 
development.4 The ‘new democratic’ revolution relied on a worker-peasant 
alliance as well as a ‘united front’ that also included the national bourgeoisie, 
the progressives and patriots from intermediate social groups, and even an 
‘enlightened’ gentry. The united front was seen as one of the ‘three magic 
weapons’ of revolutionary success, along with party construction and armed 
struggle.5 
A ‘land revolution’ in a ‘semi-colonial, semi-feudal’ society appears 
problematic to anyone who believes that a large proletariat is needed 
for any socialist transition.6 But they are mistaken, both empirically and 
conceptually, in relation to the Chinese case. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, China’s relatively small working class was significantly larger in size 
and stronger in political capacity than the weak national bourgeoisie. This 
asymmetry is explained by the substantial foreign presence in the Chinese 
economy: workers in foreign-controlled factories were a growing class, 
while domestic industrialists and merchants were a shrinking one, squeezed 
by foreign capital. The industrial working class became an independent and 
vital revolutionary force, taking such tremendously daring actions as the 
Hunan miners’ movements (1922-25), the Guangzhou-Hong Kong general 
strikes (1925-26) and the three Shanghai workers’ uprisings (1926-27). Even 
after the counterrevolutionary slaughter of 1927, despite their devastating 
losses, workers became the core of the red army and urban underground 
party work. In addition, as exemplified by the founders of Marxism 
themselves, the communist intellectuals were an organic component of the 
proletariat. ‘Petty bourgeois’ intellectuals drawn to the Chinese revolution 
had to temper themselves through guerrilla warfare and grassroots work. 
These locally specific class factors, the party, workers and sympathetic 
intellectuals, were what in turn made it possible to educate and organize the 
poor and middle peasants, who were crucial in enabling the revolution to 
recruit soldiers and constantly defend and expand its rural bases. 
The class basis of any political party and the nature of any national 
revolution are also determined by the way the country in question is globally 
located. The effectively proletarian character of China’s peasant revolution 
was also due to the position of the Chinese nation in an epoch of global 
capitalism and uneven and compressed development.7 Under siege by 
competing imperialist forces, the exploited and oppressed ‘class’ status of 
China itself gave its resistance a class-like character. It was this condition of 
a ‘nation-class’ that allowed the Chinese Communist Party to emerge as an 
innovative working-class organization, and gave the country’s democratic 
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revolution a socialist outlook and aim.8 These developments, as recognized at 
the time, were on par with struggles and events elsewhere in the international 
communist movement. ‘Class’, either in its conventional or in its extended 
usage, cannot be a positivist category superficially described by occupations, 
hierarchies or locations. Its connotation must rather be constructed through 
the application of a locally and globally appropriate political economy.
This clarification is necessary because dogmatic misconceptions about 
the Chinese revolution, though not new, still lead to some implausible 
and politically detrimental conclusions about the present day. It is a gross 
factual oversimplification to maintain, without distinguishing between 
Mao’s continued revolution and its post-Mao derailing, that due to its 
‘petty bourgeois’ attributes the CCP leadership has undergone a direct 
transmutation ‘from nationalist revolutionaries into a bureaucratic ruling 
class’. It is also theoretically erroneous to approvingly classify market reforms 
as the ‘consolidation of the bourgeois revolution’, needed before the working 
class would finally grow to make the next move, in the ‘correct’ sequence 
of societal evolution.9 In these perspectives, Chinese socialism either never 
seriously existed, or was no more than a doomed and parenthetical episode. 
However, even fair-minded liberals recognize the depth and significance of 
the Chinese revolution;10 and astute Marxist analyses show that a decisive 
degeneration of the party did not seriously occur until after the reform regime 
embarked on a ‘wrong march’.11 Dismissal of the authenticity and immensity 
of the socialist experiment in China, and ignorance of the radical differences 
between the party lines and state policies of the pre- and post-reform eras, 
also unintentionally echo much of the familiar Cold War narrative. Evident 
continuities notwithstanding, the latter era was in fact conditioned by its 
(partial) repudiation of the former’s revolutionary and socialist legacies.
The arrogant view that revolutionary Chinese communists, with 
their petty bourgeois backgrounds, were unable to prepare for a socialist 
transformation overlooks the historical evidence. It fails to register how 
quickly and smoothly the communist modernizers nationalized industries 
and commerce, and collectivized agriculture, in the 1950s. In most sectors 
nationalization was preceded by a stage of public-private partnership, and 
the government introduced a novel scheme to give affected capitalists a fixed 
percentage of dividends in compensation. Collectivization, too, progressed 
by and large voluntarily ‘with neither the violence nor the massive sabotage 
characteristic of Soviet collectivization’.12 Missing from the orthodox critiques 
of all persuasions is the power of politics to redirect history in defiance of 
the ‘normal’ historical sequence of capitalism preceding socialism. Worse 
still, vulgar economism also offers a ‘justification’ for capitalist measures, 
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including state-imposed and at times violent privatization programmes of 
publically owned enterprises and services. Remarkably enough, neoliberals 
find themselves supported by Marxists in treating global integration as 
something natural. Their reasoning is perfectly in line with Beijing’s 
deformed Marxism, euphemistically interpreted as validating an ultimately 
unskippable capitalist phase. 
As though to mock the charge that the communist project in a peasant 
China could only be substandard, the new regime proudly described itself 
as a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ rather than a proletarian one. As in 
Eastern Europe, the former description simply signified majority rule for 
the people against their enemies. In communist terminology this rhetorical 
invention signalled a popular front style of politics inherited from the 
broadly based Chinese revolution, in contrast to the Russian revolution 
and the more industrialized Soviet Union. Although the Chinese did 
not shelve the notion of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, it did not 
prevail in the country’s political discourse until the idea of ‘continuing 
the revolution’ came to dominate official ideology in the run-up to the 
Cultural Revolution.13 The vitality of the initial linguistic choice deserves 
special attention, however. It reflected China’s fundamental socio-historical 
conditions in which the peasantry could not be sacrificed to modernization. 
The peasant population instead must be turned into an agent of socialist 
transformation, both for their society as much as for themselves. Thus the 
successive revolutionary movements from ‘new democracy’ to socialism had 
duly transcended the Marxian law of industrial proletarianization. As such, 
the ‘people’, in its specific historical and discursive frame, was unmistakably 
a primary marker of class power. The same can be said of the term ‘mass 
line’, found throughout the constellation of Chinese communist conceptual 
constructions. In the same vein, the terms ‘women’ in relation to women’s 
liberation, and ‘nationality’ in relation to ethnic equality and solidarity, also 
have an intrinsic class signification.
While ‘the people’ was positively defined to include multiple classes, 
and negatively defined against class enemies, the classes included in ‘the 
people’ ceased to exist as economic realities after the land reform and 
the ‘socialist transition’ that had been accomplished by 1956: class labels 
no longer denoted membership of a space in the existing socioeconomic 
structure when landlordism and capitalism had already been eliminated. Yet 
such capsule designations, affixed to persons and households according to 
their categorized economic situations, usually up to three years before the 
liberation, continued to count heavily in determining people’s social and 
political statuses, and in the long run exhausted and soured the population.14 
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As class labelling became materially baseless, the language of class functioned 
as an ideological mechanism of mobilization in the new regime’s struggle 
for survival and national development. But there were also other, real and 
serious, class divisions, quite independent of any remnants of the old class 
system, that were in contradiction with the egalitarian socialist project. At least 
three such divisions stand out: the structural inequality between the urban 
and rural sectors of society, with the latter being subject to the extraction 
of resources to finance industrialization through ‘internal accumulation’; 
the privileges accorded to higher-ranked cadres; and discrimination against 
those with a ‘bad’ class background.15 
Social inequalities and bureaucratic degeneration worried Mao so much 
that he called for the resumption of the mass class struggles that at the 1956 
party congress had been judged to be over. The Anti-Rightist campaign 
of 1957, catalyzed in part by the events in Poland and Hungry, led him to 
declare that ‘the principal contradiction in Chinese society’ was that existing 
between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and between the socialist and 
capitalist roads. Guided by the idea of ‘taking class struggle as the key link’, 
the Lushan conference of 1959, instead of launching, as originally intended, 
a correction of the ultra-leftism that had been responsible for the failures 
of the Great Leap Forward, embarked on a campaign against the ‘rightist 
tendency’. In 1962, Mao again reminded his mass followers to ‘never forget 
class struggle’ so as to prevent ‘capitalist restoration’ in a presumably ‘very 
long period of transition from socialism to communism’.16 These calls were 
answered by an intense run of further political campaigns. Aside from 
intensified criticisms of the ‘bourgeois rights’ that Marx had referred to in 
the Critique of the Gotha Program and the ‘three great distinctions’ (of urban-
rural, industrial-agricultural and mental-manual labour divide), the ‘socialist 
education movement’ of 1964-65 targeted corrupt local officials. Always 
‘culturally’ vigilant, the Maoist revolution was promoted also in education, 
literature and the (performing) arts, so as to ‘let the workers, peasants and 
soldiers occupy the ideological superstructure’ of campuses, newspapers 
and stages. Doctors and other elite intellectuals were urged to serve in the 
countryside. Mao’s keen sense of cultural hegemony found expression in 
a cultural revolution which also had an impact on ‘1968’ in the capitalist 
heartlands.17
The extraordinary Cultural Revolution, doing battle with the party-state 
itself, was officially launched in 1966 to encourage ‘the dark side of our 
work to be exposed openly, completely, and from bottom up’ for socialist 
rejuvenation, as Mao put it. A few years earlier, he had warned the party to 
‘guard against revisionism, particularly the emergence of revisionism at the 
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party center’.18 The theory of the Cultural Revolution especially singled out 
‘capitalist roaders’ from what it saw as a bureaucratized ‘new bourgeoisie’ 
within the communist party. Nothing less than a mass counter-movement 
of the working class and young rebels could bring them down. The methods 
adopted, known as forms of a ‘grand democracy’, were specified as ‘speaking 
out freely, airing views fully, big-character posters, and big debates’, along 
with self-organization on legitimate democratic lines. Seemingly an irrational 
exercise in populist self-destruction, ‘grand democracy’ aimed to force the 
ruling apparatus open to popular scrutiny as the only way of rescuing socialism 
from erosion. But this unprecedented, singular event is not comprehensible 
without the international context also being taken into account. External 
contradictions could heighten domestic ones. Among several formidable 
geopolitical problems, there was a real risk of war. With Vietnam and the 
Sino-Soviet split in the foreground, China faced both imperialist and ‘social 
imperialist’ superpowers.19 
The inner-party line about the struggle on which the Cultural Revolution 
was based, theoretically mirroring class struggle in society, turned out to be 
obscure. The absence of economically definable, exploitative social classes 
meant a ‘categorical breakdown’ – i.e. class categories were incapable of 
identifying the politically most relevant forces in the movement. If the 
underlining struggle was in reality one between a monopolistic political class 
and a mass revolt driven by accumulated discontent, the disjunction between 
class and politics, and between politics and political language, needed to 
be repaired.20 Workers (and soldiers) had to be sent to universities, middle 
schools and many other organizations to stop the turmoil of anarchism and 
factionalism, with orders that ‘the working class must lead in all spheres’. 
Those who were sent, however, were themselves engaged in quite a few 
localized ‘civil wars’ before a ‘great unity’ could be achieved with the 
formation of provincial and municipal ‘revolutionary committees’ in 1967-
68. Since the spontaneous organizations were based less on class than on 
factions, an obvious tension arose between the ideology of class and factional 
cleavages within the same classes. Ambitious and ambiguous as it was, a 
Cultural Revolution in search of a yet-to-be-configured target was doomed 
if only because it came too early, too fast. Indeed, ‘while the Cultural 
Revolution disclosed the problems of socialism, it could not resolve them: 
the socialist system, such as it was, could not transform the existing power 
structure without undermining its own foundation’.21 
The primacy of the friend-enemy antithesis is a political sine qua non 
for a revolutionary people. Revolutions in China, however, consistently 
inclined to exaggerate internal enemies, resulting in excessive purges. The 
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wrong people were persecuted for the wrong reasons, and the physical 
and psychological suppression of dissent entailed abuses of civil rights and 
personal injuries. Consequently, resentment and alienation grew to the 
point that Deng’s subsequent policy reorientation initially had a popular 
mandate. Even if Chinese socialism was pursued against incredible odds, 
which posed profound moral dilemmas, there can certainly be no excuse for 
victimization. The confusion of two kinds of contradiction – those ‘between 
the people and their enemies’, and those ‘among the people themselves’, as 
delineated in Mao’s own Correctly Handling the Contradictions among the People 
(1957) – was unforgiveable. Worse still, the disaster did not stop there. It 
metamorphosed into a crooked fusion of marketization and bureaucratization 
as the elites attacked in the Cultural Revolution took a horrendous revenge.
‘NO ARGUING’: THE POLITICS OF CLASS DENIAL
In striking contrast with Maoist ideology and the politics of class struggle, 
Deng Xiaoping’s motto was ‘no arguing’. It in effect forbade debating 
the direction of reform in terms of socialism versus capitalism. At first a 
pragmatic expedient to deradicalize society, the rule quickly hardened into 
a dogma of economic development as ‘an absolute priority’. Ironically, this 
ideology against ideology was the product of an intense political struggle in 
1978 for ‘liberating the mind’, with a view to delegitimating any opposition 
based on socialist moral concerns – a project that anticipated a second round 
of the ‘end of ideology’ drive in the reconfiguration of global economics 
and politics after the Cold War.22 Central to the process was a tacit refusal of 
socialist experiments in general, and a frontal denunciation of class struggle 
in particular. As a key element in the ‘depoliticization of the definition of 
class’, the apolitical Weberian language of ‘strata’ and ‘social stratification’ 
was introduced in public communication.23 The problem, however, is that 
even if the narrative of class is subverted, the realities speak for themselves. 
The manifest return of some pre-revolutionary class divisions during the 
reforms, along with the important formation of some new classes, cannot 
in the end be concealed. Officially attempted linguistic remedies, from 
‘common prosperity’ and ‘harmonious society’ to a shared ‘Chinese dream’, 
only serve to uneasily epitomize disparities and disharmony. 
Hyper growth in China may have contributed to the impressive 
reduction of abject poverty and a markedly improved standard of living – a 
feat largely attributable to the infrastructural groundwork that had been laid 
before. But that growth is also seriously offset by its grave human, social and 
environmental costs.24 As the ideology and practice of egalitarianism were 
‘rationally’ condemned for the sake of efficiency, society became more and 
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more polarized. By 2011, the richest 10 per cent of Chinese families had an 
annual income that was 21 times that of the lowest 10 per cent; and the top 
20 per cent of average urban incomes were 67 times as high as those of the 
bottom 20 per cent of average rural incomes. Slowly falling inequalities have 
been claimed in a few areas, but the overall trend persists, and on regional, 
sectoral, ethnic and gender lines as well.25 Especially feeling the pain are 
workers on low wages or suffering from arrears of wages; peasants working 
in unprofitable farming or suffering from land loss and social insecurity; 
and migrant workers struggling to cope with residential discrimination and 
family separation (leaving behind their children and elderly relatives in the 
dilapidated villages) on top of exploitation or sweatshop conditions at their 
workplaces. If labour in the new China had once enjoyed access to the 
means of production and political recognition, its commodification negates 
those fundamental gains. In today’s media, the ‘leading class’ (according 
to the Constitution) of industrial workers becomes one of the country’s 
‘vulnerable social groups’.
China has 600 to 700 million loosely identified ‘farmers’, referring mostly 
to the smallholding agricultural producers still working (more or less) on 
the land after decollectivization. They have experienced post-communal 
differentiation, as well as altered and multifaceted relationships with the 
state. The umbrella category of ‘peasantry’ thus requires a class analysis of 
its changing composition.26 The coming of age of new middle peasants 
is an important example; the emergence of a class of parasitic landlords 
as rentiers living on the proceeds of land compensation, in a breakneck 
process of urbanization, is another.27 Class agency is thus a real question 
for the unfolding rural struggles from below over land, for security, against 
privatization or against the big agribusiness preferred by government policy, 
and so on. To the extent that peasants can and do reorganize themselves in 
production, consumer, marketing and other cooperatives, while adopting 
machinery and green technologies, pursuing a capitalist transformation of 
agriculture is neither rational nor practical. Above all, the impossibility of 
endless rural migrants finding stable employment in the cities, let alone all 
depending on global markets for their food needs, makes basic national 
grain self-sufficiency a necessity. Retaining their equal rights to the use of 
collective land, and their close ties to urban workers, a major section of the 
peasants could well re-emerge as an anti-capitalist political force. Such a 
force would have little to do with pre-capitalist conservatism, but much to 
do with the distinctive Chinese tradition of peasant revolution and socialism. 
The peasant, meanwhile, is an ever more plastic identity in a transitional 
economy. Of the 50 per cent of the population designated as ‘urban’ in 
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2014, a large number are unsettled. They keep travelling to attend to their 
land in busy agricultural seasons. Conversely, many rural residents take non-
farming jobs. This ‘floating’ rural-urban dualism has manifold consequences 
for class analysis. The continuous loss and shortage of farmland due to 
urban expansion, together with desertification and soil pollution, threaten 
livelihoods and national viability. This overriding condition solidifies, and 
demands a clear conception of, the role of land in China, as a means not 
just of production but also of subsistence. The fact that migrant workers 
with urban jobs have largely relied on rural resources for their family’s 
reproduction explains the existence of a very cheap labour reserve in China’s 
globalizing market. With the countryside as a social safety valve, the reform 
regime has enabled global capital to keep exploiting Chinese labour at 
an extraordinarily high rate.28 The enormous yet hidden contribution of 
China’s collective land to global capital’s accumulation and expansion still 
awaits conceptual exposure. 
The reshaping of the ruling classes, on the other hand, has transformed the 
‘communist’ state. Precisely where the voice of class is shut out, an unholy 
alliance of private and bureaucratic capital takes an unprecedented form of 
class rule, incorporating a wing of media and intellectual clients.29 In recent 
decades the private sector has grown spectacularly, taking over more than 
two-thirds of China’s ‘mixed economy’. Along the way its entrepreneurs 
– investors and managers, traders, bankers, real estate gamblers, party 
cadres and academics sitting on boards of trustees – have been politically 
empowered. Unlike the archetypal indigenous bourgeoisie who sought to 
‘save the country through industry’, and also unlike the nationalist capitalists 
typical of the East Asian developmental states, China’s new bourgeois class 
consists essentially of profit-seekers. Some were initially enriched by grabbing 
state assets at knockdown prices during successive waves of privatization. 
Among these, a particularly notorious example of greed is afforded by the 
law-breaking ‘coal bosses’ of ‘black mines’ who have dared to turn ‘cheap 
labour’ into ‘cheap lives’, with record levels of industrial deaths. More 
recently, improvements may have been made here and there in the mining 
industry, but occupational diseases and other work-related casualties remain 
shockingly prevalent across industries.30 It is true that lacking credits from 
state banks, and facing fierce competition (including competing unfairly 
with foreign capital, owing to a perverse policy preference for the latter),31 
small enterprises often find it difficult to thrive. However, the generalization 
that private entrepreneurship in China is subjugated to state capital is grossly 
and deliberately misleading, put forward to justify wholesale privatization. 
Giant, patrimonial private firms have in fact benefited hugely from legalized 
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or customized special treatment, while obtaining crucial political influence 
as well. 
Among the new elites, the most powerful are those who combine political 
advantage and economic fortunes in a peculiar market where money and 
power trade and fuse. A segment of the ‘princelings’ has managed to 
leverage their ‘background capital’ to amass wealth through exceedingly 
profitable dealings in such areas as energy, utilities, telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals, security, insurance, banking, charity foundations and 
private equity. They also tend to be compradors or agents of global capital, 
nurtured by a business environment of ‘attracting foreign investment’ at 
all cost. The inroads of a deregulated and financialized capitalism, with its 
local pillars and multinationals increasingly gaining shares in the strategic 
sectors, have dangerously eroded China’s economic independence and 
capacity. The ‘bureaucratic-comprador bourgeoisie’ recreated in the process 
resembles that of the family monopolies under semi-colonialism and the 
Guomindang kleptocracy, but is far greater in size and power. Potentially 
belonging to the same class are managers of state-owned conglomerates who 
are treated like capitalist CEOs. With combined earnings of salary, dividends, 
bonuses (often paid regardless of performance) and countless sources of grey 
income, they are paid hundreds of times more than their workers. As such, 
how public the state sector still is becomes acutely questionable. Clearly, 
the bizarre duality of bureaucratization and privatization must end. This 
call for reform, however, must not be confused with neoliberal assaults on 
public control over the nation’s essential resources and commanding-height 
industries. Such a sector has to be defended (or achieved), not dismantled. 
Bureaucratic oligarchy is not to be equated with socialist state capital, in 
which investment decisions can only be authorized democratically. 
Popular antipathy is fuelled also by the political corruption of bribery and 
patronage networks in appointments and promotions. The communist party’s 
class basis has undergone a major conversion since it formally welcomed 
private entrepreneurs into its ranks as ‘advanced elements in the new social 
strata’ in 2002. The national and local People’s Congresses have gradually 
been filled with wealthy and well-connected notables. Governmental 
and legislative positions – such as party secretaries, NPC deputies and/or 
representatives of the People’s Political Consultative Conference – have 
been almost overrun by the super rich, who are not only the beneficiaries 
of a freewheeling ‘civil society’ of asymmetrically powered ‘interest groups’, 
but are also conspicuously advocates, advisers and indeed decision-makers 
in the policy process.32 The extent of the rot is revealed in the scandal in 
Hunan in 2013 (where 56 delegates from Hengyang region were found to 
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have bought their way in the provincial People’s Congress with big money), 
on which the media coverage has been loud.33 Indeed, the party and its 
disciplinary organs have finally taken on corruption. Its anti-graft campaign 
remains highly selective, however, being used as a tool in political and 
power struggles.34 Rather than solving the problem of corruption, the party-
state has turned it into a regular organizational mechanism of bureaucratic 
capitalism.35 
In hindsight, then, we can say that since the capitalist market, which has 
catalyzed a ‘peaceful evolution’ of regime change in China, was absent at 
the time of the Cultural Revolution, that revolution was misconceived and 
premature. Yet, as the ‘cadre lords’ sitting on the common people’s backs 
have indeed grown in the marketplace and have overwhelmed resistance, the 
cultural revolutionary theory about a new bourgeoisie forming within the 
party has been vindicated. The hybrid formation of a monstrous bureaucratic 
capitalist class is genuinely tragic from a socialist point of view, in the sense 
that just as such a class is in the process of consolidating its power, another 
cultural revolution – this time with an actually existing target – is simply not 
in the cards today.
The ideological suppression of class politics by renouncing the language 
of class is thus a sign of the ruling order’s fear and sense of crisis. Class 
awareness and mobilization must be averted. The party, after all, has an 
intimate experience of arising from workers’ and peasants’ movements, not 
to mention the terrifying memory of Maoist anti-bureaucratic campaigns. 
The positivist chimera of a ‘normally’ modernizing social stratification 
represents the pressing need for a collective amnesia in face of a capitalist 
integration that is tearing Chinese society apart. Successive governments 
have thus tried hard to muffle social criticism and maintain stability by 
promoting economic booms as much as by using force. Looking at the 
history of Chinese communist rule, then, one of the most visible and greatest 
ironies is that class politics and discourse were taken to an extreme when the 
country was relatively egalitarian, and thoroughly stifled at a time of intense 
class polarization and conflict.36 The latter episode, however, is inexorably 
prompting its own demise, as the return of class is no longer avoidable. 
Interestingly, the baffling category of ‘middle class’ is exempted from the 
politics of class denial. The imaginary of such a class is associated with the 
official slogans of modernization, development and social stability, goals 
that are made absolute and employed to silence or disarm the exploited 
classes. Conceptually, the middle class is elusive as a fuzzy constitution 
without clear boundaries. Sociologists disagree on its defining factors, 
including income, education, occupation, lifestyle and aspiration, and hence 
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also on any assessment of its size in any given socioeconomic structure. 
Theoretical difficulties focus on the ‘contradictory class locations’ (in which 
some find themselves at the intersection of different classes) as well as on 
spatial disjunction between domination and exploitation in contemporary 
capitalism.37 The classical riddles also persist about whether the lower levels 
of the ‘salaried bourgeoisie’ of lawyers, doctors, managers and the like, or 
non-manual ‘brain workers’, such as white-collar employees and high-tech 
professionals, should actually constitute a part of the working class rather 
than the middle class. The mostly uncritical image of a desirable ‘middle 
class’ – fluid, obscure and a by-product of basic class positioning in capitalist 
modernity – compromises the politically charged subtext of class itself.
In a China where capitalist and post-socialist conditions mingle to erode 
public belief in equality, and to allow policies that produce inequalities, 
optimism about a middle class is especially problematic. First, such a class 
is ‘more a discourse than social structure’.38 Even if middle income earners 
are all lumped together, they are still proportionally too small to produce 
any shift towards an ‘olive-shaped’ society. With traditionally protected 
state workers losing out in the labour market, and with the unrelenting 
displacement of peasants, the prerequisite for the expansion of a middle class 
– deproletarianization – is not there. Secondly, any alleged middle class will 
be too dependent on the state and state-led development to be expected 
to be politically active. Its identity, if any, can hardly be of a steady class 
nature, if only because most of the elements assigned to such a class are tied 
to the establishment. Thirdly, the moderately wealthy can be arrogant and 
indifferent toward labour and, for that matter, towards the aggrieved rural 
poor or ethnic minorities. Their lack of a sense of solidarity with other 
classes has been shown by case after case of urban homeowners demanding 
that polluting factories should be moved elsewhere, or of gated residential 
communities asking that ‘low suzhi’ (culturally defective) migrants, such as 
garbage collectors, street vendors and prostitutes, be ‘cleaned up’.39 And, 
finally, middle-class models of civil society, citizenship and democracy 
are often not relevant to, or compatible with, the concerns of the lower 
classes.40 In this connection, China’s liberal and neoliberal intellectuals share 
many biases and weaknesses with an arguably burgeoning middle class. Any 
projected ‘class power’ of intellectual politics would be illusory or self-
deceptive if its ultimate class dependency is forgotten. 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 201538
‘IT IS RIGHT TO REBEL’: LABOUR’S AWAKENING AND THE 
QUESTION OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
Marx’s two-class theory, previously challenged by a peasant communist 
revolution, is becoming belatedly resonant in China’s export-manufacturing 
development, powered by partial proletarianization. The partially 
proletarianized consist of both traditional state sector workers and the two 
generations of new workers who have migrated from the countryside. 
The former have lost both their ‘iron rice bowl’ and their social esteem 
as hallmarks of Chinese socialism, experiencing in particular privatization-
induced unemployment. The latter became the protagonists of assembly 
factories linked to the global market.41 In hard times, the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ 
of technical personnel, small business people and job-hunting college 
graduates can also be part of the story. Dagong, literally ‘selling labour’, 
is the common (self-)depiction of a commodified labour force and its 
multilayered members. From 1991 to 2013 there was a huge increase of 
269 million in the urban workforce, 85 per cent of which was accounted 
for by rural immigration.42 Precarity through ‘informalization’ is preferred 
in the labour market, and through the ‘casualization’ of employment in 
the formal economy as well. This has resulted in a swelling pseudo-class of 
the proletarian ‘precariat’.43 Consider the case of young unmarried women 
workers as a transient yet substantial component of migrant labour in both 
the industrial and service sectors (public and domestic, formal and informal).44 
Exploitation and domination multiply by the intersected class, gender and 
rural-urban differentiations. 
Many other cleavages exist, caused by various differences between public 
and private firms, contracted and ‘dispatched’ (i.e. subcontracted) jobs 
and more or less skilled positions. The institutional barriers of residential 
bifurcation, or work unit-based pay and fringe-benefit differentials, 
continue to separate workers. Workers also socialize by regional connections 
and dialect. The changed social contract between workers and a ‘workers’ 
state’, however, is a common and superseding experience across the board. 
Particularly worth noting is how China’s educated, healthy and dedicated 
industrial workforce, nurtured by a high level of human capital investment 
relevant to a low-level national income before economic reform, has been 
subjugated. This workforce, rather than anything else, is the country’s truly 
great comparative advantage and key to explaining its economic growth.45 
But the failure to appreciate this central contribution to industrial policy and 
public culture is manifested in the way labour is brutally cheapened in a ‘race 
to the bottom’ to reduce labour costs. Appalling conditions have predictably 
followed, in terms of long hours, meagre pay, missing or incomplete or 
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fake contracts, unfulfilled legal requirements by employers to contribute 
to pension and other welfare funds, unpaid regular work and overwork, 
job insecurity, workplace hazards and, not least importantly, lack of respect 
for workers’ dignity. Things have been improving in a few aspects under 
the pressure of labour shortage in costal regions, and wages are rising. But 
violations of labour rights remain rampant.
A ruthless pattern has formed in the private sector of working 11 or 
12 hours a day, six or seven days a week, lengthy periods of night shifts, 
restricted living plus routine bullying from harsh shop-floor managers. The 
pattern has even entrapped student interns and occasionally child labour. A 
shocking string of suicides at Foxconn in 2010 exposed the extent of abuses 
and the crimes of a savage labour regime based on collusion between the 
state and private and foreign capital. The latest surge of labour protests has 
implicated many more multinationals in an age of global outsourcing. Apart 
from the Japanese-owned Uniden, a Walmart supplier in Shenzhen, which 
earlier saw a sporadic five-month strike in 2004, also involved, among others, 
are Apple, Dell and IBM suppliers (e.g. the Taiwanese-owned Foxconn 
and Hong Kongese-owned Biel Crystal), Honda plants, Samsung and 
Flextronics International contractors and Pepsi factories.46 The Yue Yuen 
complex in Dongguan, where 40,000 workers went on the largest strike 
in recent memory in April 2014, supplies products to such footwear giants 
as Nike, Reebok and Adidas. Conditions in the hidden corners of mining, 
retailing, construction and service industries tend to be even worse.47 Even 
in the public sector, workers are not free from capitalist exploitation and 
humiliation when the market operates everywhere by the logic of profit.
Class struggle has come to be waged in reality. A once-popular Maoist 
slogan in line with the ancient idea of the just rebellion against tyranny, 
‘to rebel is rightful’ has returned to vindicate striking workers, revolting 
peasants and many other protesters and petitioners. Even censored official 
news outlets admit rising ‘mass incidents’. Workers are also getting better 
organized and more informed about movements elsewhere, near and far, 
through cell phones, text messages and microblogs (a version of Twitter). 
In 2012-13, strikes took place in various production sites of Foxconn and 
Honda. Most recently, workers in a sister factory in Jiangxi acted in solidarity 
with fellow shoe-making workers on strike in Yue Yuen. Thousands of 
bus drivers in Shenzhen walked away from work at the same time, as did 
workers in the China Operations of International Business Machines. 
From jumping to kill oneself to collective action for change, what does 
this development signify? Is it a likely ‘historic turning point’ for the Chinese 
working class after decades of defeat, retreat and silence? Is China on its way 
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to be ‘the world’s class-struggle capital’?48 While pondering these questions, 
one must keep in mind the major fact that although official trade unions 
and government arbitration commissions sometimes side with workers or 
adopt conciliatory approaches, local authorities often also deploy police to 
beat and arrest ‘troublemakers’, as they consider labour organizing a major 
menace to be suppressed, even on occasion preemptively. Thugs are also 
frequently hired to violently dispel gathering workers. A necessary concern 
is thus the altered nature of the state apparatus. In a now outmoded but all 
too apt terminology, Mao predicted that the communist decay would lead 
not to bourgeois democracy, but to a capitalist and fascist dictatorship.49 
But despite the new dynamics of popular struggle, the labour movement 
in particular is caught in a remarkable post-socialist dilemma. The influences 
from the socialist past interfere in the present, blurring or blending support 
and control, consent and coercion, on both sides of industrial relations. The 
state and its corporatist arm, the All China Federation of Trade Unions, 
require by law a union branch in every minimally sizeable workplace. Such 
unions are supposed to act on their workers’ behalf and they indeed do, half-
heartedly and intermittently, even winning concessions from management.50 
But under a policy guideline that prioritizes a ‘good investment environment’ 
such unions cannot be the workers’ own, and not just because they hold 
few democratic elections and barely advance working-class interests. The 
ambiguity over independent unionization lies in the understanding that it 
would let a socialist state forgo its moral and material responsibilities for 
the wellbeing of its workforce. As already evident on the ground, any fair 
settlement in labour disputes is unlikely, given the sheer imbalance of power 
between labour and capital. Workers are learning to fight through legal 
channels only because they have lost a state committed to their fundamental 
right to both economic security and political recognition. 
Most telling is China’s reform of labour legislation in relation to the ‘rule 
of law’ (which is indispensable for a market economy). The 1994 Labour 
Law was revised in the 2008 Labour Contract Law, a landmark text for 
the government’s refusal to side with labour on a moral ground beyond 
legality. Industrial relations are now straightforwardly a matter of legal and 
procedural, rather than social, justice. Under the current circumstances, a 
positive upshot of the law is that it requires the formalization of employment 
through a labour contract. Such requirement could intensify certain forms 
of discrimination against those considered less economic to employ (e.g. 
avoiding the cost of maternity leave by not hiring women), but the majority 
find the requirement beneficial. However, the law as stipulated on paper 
is not the same as its enforcement. Without the necessary political will to 
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enforce the 1994 law, two decades on, China’s legal eight-hour workday 
is still scarcely followed in the low-end private sector. A large number of 
urban workers remain not formally contracted. In 2013, no less than 82 per 
cent of forty million construction workers, for instance, had not signed any 
labour contracts. Their legal appeals to the relevant government agencies 
were denied consideration precisely on the ground that without detailed 
rights specified in a contract they were not covered by the protection of 
the law!51 The rights of workers in the large informal economy are similarly 
excluded from the scope of the law. The legalization process itself has also 
been accompanied by market greed and corruption, which curb the effect 
of the resulting law.
The problems with a solely legal approach still go farther. Legality is after 
all also instrumental of containing contentious politics. Insofar as a strike is 
not really lawful – the clause on the freedom to strike was removed in the 
1983 constitutional amendment – strikers can be coerced and their leaders 
can be sacked or even criminalized or otherwise punished. More subtly, 
since the legal framework is based on individualized rights, it functions to 
trim the formation and expression of collective class interests. The Labour 
Law incorporates workers as atomized contract-takers and market actors 
essentially subordinated to capital accumulation. Equally problematic is 
‘weiquan’, or the protection of the right to civic activism. This has attracted 
much attention from international circles concerned with labour and human 
rights, but it remains ‘a hegemonic discourse propagated by the political and 
social elites’ of middle-class liberals. The campaign for such rights confines 
disputes and arbitration to an individualistically and reactively framed legal 
manner. The result ‘constitutes a decisive constraint on unions’ claims, 
options, and strategies in their representation efforts’.52 Just as depoliticized 
proceduralism treats as inferior the people who ought to be lawmakers 
themselves (which is after all a fair definition of democracy), unionism or 
syndicalism cannot be the consciousness of class liberation. A unionized 
movement for labour rights through ‘collective bargaining’ may facilitate 
minor reforms while defusing conscious class struggle. 
As workers’ outlooks, abilities and militancy in different situations and 
places develop unevenly, it is difficult to generalize about class consciousness 
in China. Traditional workers, having lived through class wars and social 
revolutions, and benefited from honoured entitlements, oppose privatization 
and its long and painful aftermath. Their nostalgia for the socialist past may 
involve some romanticization, but mainly they are aware that, beyond 
individual companies or capitalists, a presently triumphant capitalism has to 
be countered.53 This standpoint was made clear, for example, in the 2009 
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strike in the state-owned Tonghua Steel in Jilin, a major northeastern base 
of new China’s industrialization. New workers, on the other hand, have yet 
to grasp their own class position independent of the influence of the liberal 
intellectual ‘protectors’ of their civic rights. The personal and job mobility 
and hence fluid identity of younger workers could also be an obstacle to class 
consciousness, if the classical pattern of working-class formation remains 
viable at all: class is not fixed at the point of production or distribution. It is 
formed and transformed culturally as well, and the organization and structure 
of workers’ feelings are fostered by their concentration in shared working and 
living communities. Three decades into intense market integration, migrant 
workers have begun to transcend their spontaneous protests over immediate 
material concerns. The Shenzhen Hengtong rubber factory strike in 2013 
was triggered by the installation of cameras to put machine operators under 
close surveillance without their prior consent. The two groups of workers, 
traditional and new, are merging in a common search of class subjectivity. 
The conjuncture of ‘state meets capital’ – as a worker’s poem accurately 
captures it – necessitates resistance.54 
At the theoretical level, the long debate in the Marxist canon over Lukács’s 
History and Class Consciousness cannot engage us here. Suffice it to note 
the ongoing relevance of the language of class, of ‘commodity fetishism’, 
‘exploitation’, ‘alienation’ and ‘surplus value’. It is a conceptual vehicle that 
workers could employ in surmounting their atomization, dependency and 
falsely perceived powerlessness. The existing social order is certainly not 
‘natural’ or impossible to resist. China’s positioning in the capitalist world 
does not have to be what it is. And class struggle is the only decisive way 
for the working class, in ‘conscious actions’, to defy ‘the fate of history’. 
Whether class consciousness is ‘imputed’ from within or injected from 
outside, it is in the practice of class politics that a working class engages in its 
own making, that it ‘historically happens’.55 However, if class consciousness 
is both contingent and dependent on the ideological rhythm of class struggle, 
questions concerning the party and party-class relations remain pivotal. Any 
new ‘modern prince’ must still clarify its relationship with the ‘popular state’ 
on one hand and the working class on the other.56 This is highly relevant 
because of Chinese particularities – the communist party’s world historical 
defeat in its voluntary or suicidal surrender to global capitalism. Yet in 
light of the party’s ability to contrive a unique and brilliant answer to these 
questions in the earlier revolutionary practices of party construction and 
the mass line, it is fair to ask whether it really has terminally exhausted its 
internal and external resources of renovation. 
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‘POLITICS IN COMMAND’: THE STATE, DISCURSIVE POWER 
AND THE RETURN OF CLASS POLITICS
It would be a serious error to treat the question of class and class consciousness 
in China as something new, forgetting its invaluable national and local 
histories. That is, at issue in the current Chinese context is not only a ‘retreat 
from class’; it is also the overturning of class power itself. This power was 
brought into being, in however limited ways, by the communist revolution. 
Its dismantling is measured by the destruction of the party-state’s popular 
base. This loss of a socialist state, along with the party and its cultural capital 
and ideological supremacy, is catastrophic for the labouring classes. For 
a hitherto oppressed people, losing a hard-won state of its own – real or 
perceived – is losing the whole lot. Differences among modern states, or 
between variously socialist or variously capitalist natures of a state, have a 
huge impact on society and the conditions of existence of social classes. 
Globalization may have generally impinged on the autonomy and capacity 
of national states; the domestic labour regime under state purview is still 
what affects workers most.
The notion of state manipulation or management of class is part of a 
broader theoretical consensus that modernity in general and capitalism in 
particular have needed state sponsorship from the outset. The territorial 
state was the ‘ultimate linchpin’ of capitalist development, not least because 
capital expansion required a unified national market as well as political 
power to survive class antagonism.57 The structural versus instrumentalist 
interpretations of the state is the focus of several influential debates among 
Marxists. Concerning the ruling communists as modernizers more specifically, 
the competing conceptions of state socialism and state capitalism are both 
pertinent, and the thesis concerning the social democratic state’s ‘structural 
dependence on capital’ might be borrowed as well.58 Whatever the theory, 
empirical observations strongly support the claim that to a large degree 
the communist party-state controls class differentiation or reconstruction 
through directing class designations, regulating class relations, containing 
class conflicts and indeed suppressing class foes.59 Also likely is a dialectical 
interaction between a state ‘determining’ the compass of class, and a class 
‘ruling’ by its embodiment in state machinery and policymaking. The state 
is ‘coloured’ accordingly by the dominant class. The awesome power of the 
post-revolutionary state is part of the story of ‘socialism and backwardness’ 
defying the standard contours of history. That such a state has mutated into a 
comprador-bureaucratic tyranny in China is an indicator of the impact states 
can have on class structures. But allowing conceptually for a far-reaching 
state role in class formation and relationships, and rejecting the notion that 
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the state is a neutral force above classes, should not lead to substituting the 
state for the relations of production. The autonomy of the state remains 
relative. What recent Chinese history does underline is the expansive reach 
of the PRC state, aided by its ideological discourse of either class struggle (in 
the Mao era) or class evasion (in post-Mao reactions). 
To achieve clarity about class politics in today’s China means, then, 
seeing popular struggle to restore socialist fundamentals as requiring a phased 
and probably lengthy process of recreating the party and recapturing the 
state. The reality is that vested interests have grown so entwined with a still 
nominally socialist party-state that the latter becomes their best guarantor, 
even their hostage. On the one hand, the ideology of the ‘free’ market masks 
or ‘rationalizes’ private looting of public assets. On the other, more than a 
matter of compatibility, neoliberal policies depend on a dictatorial power to 
be implemented. China’s ever more sweeping economic neoliberalization 
(as shown in Beijing’s latest policy package announced in early 2014) only 
reconfirms this pattern of ‘growth’ and the class essence of the regime. If 
reform was initially validated by the crisis of Chinese socialism, the present 
crises of Chinese capitalism are forcing a reorientation, discarding the 
imposed rule of ‘no arguing’. Such a reorientation would in turn necessitate 
a reappropriation of the language of socialism. It would naturally begin 
with an accurate articulation of class conditions and positions since ‘it is 
the discursive structure of political language which conceives and defines 
[class] interest’. To the extent that language ‘as a process of signification’ 
is itself a form of social being, and that the struggle over the ‘ideological 
state apparatus’ is necessarily communicative, class analysis is bound to be 
discursively contentious.60 Not surprisingly, ‘discursive hegemony’ has been 
a catchphrase in Chinese internet complaints since the turn of the century. 
The renaissance of a class vocabulary must abandon all accumulated baggage 
of arbitrariness or ‘left infantilism’. But for the education and organization of 
workers, it has to be reutilized since the ‘materiality of language itself’ has been 
so powerfully demonstrated throughout China’s modern transformations.61
‘Politics in command’ must also be reappropriated. The Maoist idiom was 
spelled out by the centrality of class struggle, and premised on a decisive role 
of the party line and cadres. It was also intimately associated with the ‘mass 
line’ as a most creative and successful method of the revolution.62 The usual 
perception of the mass line as either a condescending elitist tool or a form of 
populist voluntarism is misguided. It is instead based on a conviction in the 
agency of the common people and embedded in the project and language 
of class liberation. It thus cannot be transferable without these contextual 
references. Since the communist party no longer has any distinct ideological 
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position, and the traditional party-mass relationship no longer exists, the 
‘mass line’ verbally picked up by Xi Jinping sounds merely hollow. It 
contradicts the corruption-tainted images of officials head-on, and is entirely 
alien to an all-pervasive monoculture of money and political cynicism. It 
is also incompatible with the vulnerability of labour and the glamorized 
hegemonic notion of an all-virtuous market. 
To reaccentuate politics is then to seek a counter-transformation of society 
as much as of perceptions. Just like the formation of conscious classes, the 
remaking of the masses as a political subject is a process of political struggle, 
one which would necessarily involve channelling energy and skills toward 
rebuilding the party with the goal of giving power to the people. This is 
feasible as a democratic project since the rank-and-file party members are 
themselves among the masses who need to rise up, although sympathetic 
elements at all levels of the party would need to be engaged. This would of 
course have to entail unpacking the meaning of ‘democracy’ in the shallow 
and complacent discourse of the mainstream framing of ‘political reform’, 
based as it is on capitalist integration. Democracy in China, perhaps more 
than in those countries which lack a revolutionary socialist experience, needs 
to be closely guided by the ideas of equality and social justice. Especially 
in view of the existing state-capital coalition, which could well survive or 
even control an electoral political process, formal democracy alone will be 
useless for the working classes concerned with the means of production and 
surplus retention. The only meaningful measurement instead is whether and 
how well collective preferences of the common people are articulated and 
translated into state power and policies. 
If neither capitalism nor socialism is teleological, and if class identities and 
alignment are also open ended, then winning the battle for ideas is where 
a transformative politics could attract popular agents. Notwithstanding 
unsolved conceptual issues of unprecedented class differentiations in the 
‘knowledge economy’, the more complex new division of labour in today’s 
‘cognitive capitalism’ may be ‘changing the balance of forces back in favour 
of producers’.63 As a ‘hi-tech proletariat’ and a ‘biopolitical’ and ‘cyber-
productive’ labour force grows, the ever more digital and immaterial nature 
of production and management erodes capital’s ability to exploit this new 
workforce in the way it does with traditional wage labour. More broadly, 
the inclusive concept of ‘classes of labour’ comprises all of those who 
depend directly or indirectly on selling their labour power for their own 
daily reproduction. A similar Chinese term is the ‘labouring people’ (laodong 
renmin), which encompasses the vast majority of the population, including 
the large sections of the ‘semi-proletarianized petty bourgeoisie’.64 Another 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 201546
comparable but also distinct identity is ‘commoners’ as producers and 
consumers as well as democratic agents, which presupposes the construction 
of the commons.65 This could be the closest to the Marxian generic 
identification of ‘direct producers’ reworked against a backdrop of advanced 
productive forces and socialization of production. Politically, the vast and 
plurally constituted mass of ‘plebeians’ do not necessarily undermine class 
analysis and strategy, since class provides a ‘compass of orientation – towards 
the classes of the people, the exploited, oppressed and disadvantaged in all 
their variety’.66 The theoretical question is whether or where ‘class’ ends in 
such articulations. The conceptual fact that in Maoist discourse ‘class’ is core 
to the ‘masses’ should be instructive. If Marx privileges the working class in 
terms of its acquiring consciousness, it is possible to argue that certain other 
subject positions, such as women facing patriarchy or minorities confronting 
majority chauvinism, can be privileged in their own ways. Such social groups 
acquire the consciousness of their suppression in a similar way to workers. 
That is, their identities may possess a class feature or multiple class features 
– women, ethnic minorities or migrants could be proper classes understood 
in their respective relational positions in the given political economy.67 
The point specific to China is then that capitalism is pushing the exploited 
and oppressed people together into a gigantic political force for reclaiming 
socialism. 
China’s landscape of class has twice been transformed since 1949, through 
a sequence of socioeconomic and political upheavals that have also been 
marked by a shifting discourse of class. While in the official rhetoric the term 
‘socialism’ is ever emptier, it makes real sense as a protest language in labour 
and other resistance movements. However, as certain formal commitments 
and provisions to the labouring classes under the rubric of socialism have not 
been totally repudiated, they should be defended in the interest of reinstating 
or establishing class power. The remaking of the state and party must begin 
with winning back their original constituencies. The fact that the state, 
despite being aggressively interventionist, can hardly contain mounting social 
unrest indicates the inevitable return of class identities and politics. The latter 
is necessarily transformative for an alternative social order in which political 
power serves the people, and needs dominate profit. This would be a ‘war 
of position’ by the common people around organized labour and in alliance 
with their counterparts in other countries. The tragic course of capitalism 
with Chinese characteristics and its vicious human and ecological impacts 
must and can be reversed. 
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